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Within a trading system which is increasingly determined by food quality standards the
concern exists that small producers possibilities for participation on international trade
diminish. However, most concerns base on theoretical considerations and little empirical
evidence exists. 
This paper empirically analyzes the compliance decision of Moroccan tomato producers with
the EUREPGAP standard based on results of 63 interviews. By comparing the decision
process of certified and non certified producers the most important drivers for certification are
identified. Theoretically the analysis bases on the decision model of Rogers (2003) which was
developed to analyze the decision process to adopt technical innovations. 
Results of the survey open up interesting opportunities for interpretation. 1) No results are
found that small producers were particularly disadvantaged in the compliance process. 2)
Less-organized or less integrated farmers tend to be disfavored since especially forward
integration in form of being a member in a cooperative changes the cost of compliance. 3)
Forward integration tens to be of particular importance not only because of decreasing cost of
compliance but as well because of a direct access to information on the buyers requirements.
The survey explores that using the term small as a synonym for less organized, less educated
and technically less advanced production tends to be false when looking at small producers in
the export value chain. These producers are small in relative terms and often larger in size as
well as in capital and human capital than small producers producing for the domestic market. 1
The Compliance Decision with Food Quality Standards on Primary Producer Level;
A Case Study of the EUREPGAP Standard in the Moroccan Tomato Sector
1  Introduction
Due to their low demand for land and their high labor requirements, fruit and vegetable
sectors are principally seen as sectors where small producers have a chance to participate.
However, there is some concern that small producers’ participation in international fruit and
vegetable trade is diminishing because of the increasing prevalence of food quality standards
in the sector. Standards lead to a process of redistribution (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005). While
they open up opportunities to some producers by permitting market access for particular
market segments, they exclude others by posing prohibitively high barriers which are the
result of the short-term and long-term efforts that go hand in hand with production under a
certain standard. 
This paper aims to analyze two particular questions. 1) Which producers comply, and which
do not comply? And 2) Why do some producers comply with the standards while others do
not? 
This paper aims to analyze the two questions by offering a comprehensive empirical analysis
of the compliance decision-making process based on a case study of the Moroccan tomato
export sector where private certification is of particular relevance, since nearly 90% of the
tomatoes are exported to the EU market. The survey analyses drivers for a compliance
decision by comparing determinants of the decision-making processes of non-certified
producers with those of certified ones. 
The analytical framework is based on the decision model developed by Rogers (2003) as part
of innovation diffusion research. The model provides the opportunity of placing the decision-
making unit at the center of the analysis, while integrating it into a close network of
economic, social and institutional determinants. 2
2  Theoretical Framework 
The paper uses the decision model developed by Rogers (2003) as part of innovation diffusion
theory as the theoretical concept. The link to innovation theory results from the fact that food
quality standards are a specific form of innovation from a producer perspective.
1 However,
some differences exist, since innovations lead from a traditional perspective to an increase in
technical efficiency. By contrast, innovation in food quality does not necessarily lead to some
kind of production advantage. Food quality innovations result in higher food quality and/or in
a better information transfer of product and process information. At the same time, they may
even be contraproductive to the technical production process of the firm (Walgenbach and
Beck, 2003). Gains in food safety innovations can only take place if the product with a higher
quality is differentiable from lower quality products. Quality standards are used to
differentiate products and to guarantee that the production complies with a certain level of
quality. Hence, food standards not only consist of innovations, the standard itself is a certain
form of innovation.
The compliance process with food standards is determined by the decision-making process of
the decision-making unit. Rogers (2003) defines the decision-making process as an
information-seeking and information-processing activity in which an individual is motivated
to reduce uncertainty about the advantages and disadvantages of an innovation. The decision-
making unit extends from the first knowledge of an innovation, to forming an attitude towards
the innovation, to a decision to adopt or reject, to the implementation of the new idea and to a
confirmation of this decision (Rogers, 2003). Rogers identifies several determinants that
affect the decision-making process and push it in a positive or negative direction. 
All in all, three major groups of determinants affect the decision-making process 1)  The
characteristics of the innovator, 2) the characteristics of the innovation and 3) the institutional
environment (Weinjert, 2002). Rogers puts a lot of emphasis on the characteristics of the
                                                
1 Rogers (2003) defines an innovation to be an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual. 3
innovation and the innovator, while he rarely includes the institutional environment and
concepts of governance and pressure within value chains in his discussion. Rogers rather
concentrates on the internal production process of the firm which can be explained by the fact
that he developed the model to analyze decision-making processes with technical innovations.
For this case study Roger’s model has been modified by changing some of the determinants
affecting the compliance decision. More emphasis is put on the institutional environment. 
Fig. 1: Dependent variables in the decision-making process and their determinants 
Source: Own illustration modified from Rogers (2003). 
Figure 1 shows that the decision-making process is, to a large extent, not directly affected by
the determinants, but indirectly through the perceived costs and benefits of the standard.
2
Hence, the conceptual framework for the analysis of the decision-making process has to
include a second analytical level. 
Each stage of the decision-making model is represented by a dependent variable which is
determined directly or indirectly by the three groups of determinants. At the knowledge stage,
the dependent variable is represented by the costs of information. These represent the costs of
the decision-making unit to receive a certain level of information which is appropriate for him
or her to formulate an attitude towards the standard. The knowledge which is needed to
                                                
2 The perceived costs and benefits of compliance can be considered beliefs of the costs and benefits related to an innovation.
This indicates the perceived value of compliance (Frambach and Schillewaert 1999).







































































formulate an attitude may differ tremendously among producers. At the attitude stage and the
decision-making stage, the dependent variables were bivariate since both the attitude and the
decision of the decision-making unit can turn out to be positive or negative. Both stages are
affected indirectly by the determinants through the perceived costs and benefits of
compliance. On the implementation stage the dependent variables are the costs and benefits of
compliance. The producers face at this stage, for the first time, the real costs of compliance
(except for the costs of information at the knowledge stage). The benefits of compliance is
seldom noticeable immediately, since investment in food quality standards are long term
investments. 
3  Methodological framework 
Data collection for the research was conducted in 2006 by semi-structured interviews with 63
Moroccan tomato producers in the region of Souss Massa. More than 70% of total tomato
exports come from this zone. In the Moroccan tomato export sector, the most important
private certificate at farm level is the EUREPGAP standard (the shortage is a combination of
the shortage of the European retailer produce working group and the shortage of good
agricultural practices). The survey concentrates on the EUREPGAP standards, since it has
turned out to be quasi mandatory for exports in the European market for some years. 
The total sample was taken out of a population of approx. 600 producers who produce at least
partly for the export market (APEFEL; 2006) and whereof around 207 were certified
EUREPGAP (EUREPGAP, 2006). To guarantee a sufficiently high number of EUREPGAP
certified producers the total sample was split into two sub-samples. 33 interviewees have not
been certified while the other 30 interviewees have been certified EUREPGAP. 
A questionnaire was developed for the two sample groups which contains qualitative as well as
quantitative parts. The questionnaire was developed with respect to the theoretical background
of the decision-making model and aimed to collect information on the drivers of the decision-
making process. 5
Data was analyzed following the structure of the decision-making model and determinants of
the decision-making process were linked to the stages. A comprehensive understanding of the
decision-making process results, which allows one to identify particular differences among
the group of compliers and the group of non-compliers. 
4  The Compliance Decision with Food Safety Requirements; Results of the Survey
4.1  The Knowledge Stage
As shown in Figure  1, the dependent variable for the knowledge stage are the costs of
information. They reflect the monetary and physical efforts the decision-making unit has to
undertake to receive a certain level of information which is needed to formulate an attitude
towards the standard. For this survey, indicators were identified reflecting whether producers
tend to face higher or lower costs of information in the first stage of their decision-making
process. 
A first indicator is the appearance of the standard as part of the communication structure of
the sector. The more a standard is included in the communication structure of the sector, the
fewer individual efforts producers have to undertake to receive the initial knowledge of it.
Results of the survey show that, except for one producer, all interviewees are familiar with the
EUREPGAP standard.
3 Information on the standards’ existence were communicated within
the sector horizontally among farmers. Both groups, the certified and the non-certified
interviewees, indicated the group of "other producers" as the most important source of initial
information on the standard. As the second important source of initial information, certified
producers mentioned the “packing stations”. These show much lower importance as a source
of information for non-certified producers. For the latter group, the second important source
of information are phytosanitary vendors. 
                                                
3 The Nature's Choice standard in contrast was unknown to nearly 70% of the interviewees.6
This difference provides a first impression of the existence of a structural difference between
certified and non-certified producers. Certified producers receive information from downstream
actors in the value chain while non-certified producers receive information from external agents.
This difference is afforded even stronger relevance when turning away from the initial
information to the principal source of information on EUREPGAP. 
Figure 2: Principal Sources of Information on EUREPGAP for certified and non-
certified producers
 = non-certified;  = certified; 
Source: own elaboration, 
Nearly all certified producers indicated that packing stations or consulting organizations were
their major source of information. The group of non-certified producers also stated that
packing stations were their principal source of information on EUREPGAP, followed by the
categories of other producers and phytosanitary vendors. However, even though both groups
reported that packing stations were their most important source of information, non-certified
producers possess significantly less information on EUREPGAP. 
The results indicate that more specific information on EUREPGAP is not provided internally
by the sector. By hiring a consultant organization, producers internalize the generation of
required knowledge for the certification process. Consulting organizations supply "packages"
which include consulting for the total upgrading process including all relevant steps up to the
final external audit. 
don't have
much info

















The reason why certified producers receive information to a larger extent, but also in a more
detailed manner from downstream actors, can be found in their frequent tendency to forward
integration in the value chain (22 out of 30 certified producers are somehow involved in the
higher chain level. Either by being a member of a cooperative or being the owner of a
company). 
Summarizing the results for the knowledge stage, the survey shows that the costs of initial
information for the EUREPGAP standard are relatively low due to the high prevalence of the
standard in the communication system of the sector, while more specific information on the
standard has to be generated internally by the producer (mainly by hiring a consultant
organization either at production level or at the level of the packing station). 
4.2  The Attitude Stage 
At the attitude stage, the producer formulates a positive or a negative attitude towards the
standard. The dependent variable is determined by the perceived costs and benefits of
compliance. In a second order, the perceived costs and benefits were mainly affected by the
decision-making unit’s characteristics (how does the decision-making unit interpret and
experience future costs and benefits) and by the external influences on the producer (does the
producer experience any pressure from trading partners which pushes his/her attitude in a
positive direction or does he or she receive any positive or negative information from external
sources). 
The way the non-certified decision units experience the standard's cost, benefit, risk and
feasibility of certified producers plays an important role for the process of formulating an
attitude. Principally, the analysis showed that non-certified producers experience the direct
benefits of the certification of other producers to be relatively low. As depicted in Table 1,
only 11 interviewees out of 33 indicated that they know someone who experiences a benefit
from certification. The most important benefit no-certified producers experience from8










Certified 22 0 7 1 30
Non-
Certified
2 1 29 1 33
Total 24 1 36 2 63
Source: own elaboration
Table 1: Benefits of the EUREPGAP






Preferential supplier status 0
Better commercialization 6
Other benefits 2
No one known with a direct benefit 22
Source: own elaboration
certified producers are the “better possibilities for commercialization”. Only two interviewees
indicated knowing someone who receives
better prices due to his or her certification.
Several interviewees underlined that,
especially in the export season of 2005/6,
prices decreased tremendously
independently of whether producers were
certified or not. This led to the fact that producers who had been certified within 2005 mostly
received lower prices with a certification than the year before without it. 
Nevertheless or even in contrast to this rather negative experience of their colleagues'
certification, nearly all non-certified interviewees had a positive attitude towards the
certification. With the exception of one interviewee, all producers underlined their willingness
to be certified whenever they would have the possibility to do so. 
The most important motivation for certification is the great concern of losing a share of the
market in future which was indicated by 29 out of 33 non-certified interviewees. However,
the concern of losing a share of the market in future seems to be relatively abstract to most
non-certified producers, as 88% of non-certified producers indicated that they had never faced
nor heard of any sanctions because of their non-compliance with EUREPGAP. As depicted in
Table 2, only three producers indicated facing any disadvantages because of their non-
certification. One of them receives lower prices and the other two will be excluded from the
packing station if they don't start
the certification process in 2007. 
On the contrary, the analysis of
those producers who were
certified shows that 22 out of 30
interviewees faced sanctions from their packing station in cases of non compliance. All 229
producers faced the risk of losing a share of the market, because of their buyers changing to
other suppliers in the case of non-compliance. 
Summarizing the results of the attitude stage, the survey shows that even non-certified
interviewees tend to show a positive attitude towards the EUREPGAP standard even though
they perceive the direct benefit of certified producers to be marginal. There is general concern
about losing a share of the market in the case of non-compliance. However, results of the
survey hint at the fact that market losses are perceived as relatively abstract to non-certified
producers. 
4.3  Decision-making Stage
At the decision-making stage, the producer actively undertakes activities which finally lead to
a positive or negative decision. This might be, for example, the active way of searching for
information about the standard. Twenty-eight out of the 33 non-certified producers indicated
that they had a relatively concrete idea about the changes needed on their farm for the
compliance process and at least 24 of them had an idea about the investment needed. The
survey analyzed whether certain determinants of the compliance process affect the perceived
costs and benefits of compliance and on the reasons why producers finally decided not to
comply with the ERUEPGAP standard. 
Figure 3: Perceived Costs of Compliance of Non-Certified Producers per Ha




























The figure depicts the extremely high variance of the perceived costs among non-certified
interviewees. The lowest perceived costs of compliance sum is less than 50 €/ha and the
highest is around 1,975 €/ha. One reason for the high variance in the perceived costs of
compliance can be found in the knowledge of the producer concerning EUREPGAP. While
some producers already showed concrete ideas of the costs of different components in the
upgrading process, other interviewees only had a rough idea about investment in the technical
upgrading process. Interviewees with a better knowledge on the standard indicated a higher
perceived costs of compliance. 
Even though nearly all non-certified producers tend to show a positive attitude towards the
standard (which is expressed by their indication to become certified if they would see the
opportunity), none of them has taken a final positive decision for certification. As the main
reason for their non-certification, the interviewees indicated a lack of information on
EUREPGAP and as the second important reason, a lack of financial capacity. However,
answers related to the lack of information on EUREPGAP have to be interpreted carefully,
since all producers would have the possibility of hiring a consulting organization for better
information and the accompaniment of the certification process. Consequently, the lack of
information can indirectly be traced back to a lack of financial capacity. 
The lack of financial capacity seems very convincing, as the largest amount of short term
investments are incurred for the technical upgrading process of the farm and these costs have
to be borne immediately. Even though some producers receive credits from their cooperatives,
access to credit remains difficult, especially for small, less-organised and less-educated
farmers. The third point which was indicated as an impediment for non-certified producers on
the way to certification is the uncertainty producers face in terms of highly fluctuant prices.
Especially producers without a constant relation to their buyers or their packing station are
hesitant towards these investments, since they face unstable prices on the export market.
Interviewees indicated that they need a guarantee on prices and quantity to become certified. 11
4.4  The Implementation Stage
At the implementation stage, producers are confronted for the first time with real costs and
real benefits of the standard. The survey wants to analyze whether certain determinants of the
compliance process affect the amount of the costs and the benefits of compliance. 
Figure  4 depicts the real costs of compliance of the certified interviewees. The costs of
compliance are divided into non-recurrent and recurrent costs. Even though the non-recurrent
costs were experienced by most interviewees as more impeding, they add only the smaller
part to the total costs of compliance. The major cost components of the non-recurrent costs
were investments in the technical upgrading process of the farm (e.g. in buildings and
markers)
4. The largest part of the recurrent costs of compliance are the additional costs for
skilled labor. On average, certified producers employ 1 additional skilled worker for every
15ha. Only 4 producers indicated that they did not employ additional labor at all. On average
additional labor costs amount to 250€/ha and year. Other recurrent cost components, such as
the certificate for the standard or investment in safety clothing add only a small part to the
total costs of compliance.
The figure shows that costs of compliance differ immensely between interviewees. Minimum
costs are about 35€/ ha and year while the maximum costs are nearly 1500€. 
Figure 4: Costs of Compliance per Ha and Year




























                                                
4 Time periods for depreciation rely on own plausibility considerations. 12
The costs of compliance can be broken down into recurrent and non-recurrent costs. Even
though most interviewees experience non-recurrent costs as more of an obstacle, they only
add a small part to the total cost of compliance. The major cost components of non-recurrent
costs are investments in the technical upgrading process of the farm (e.g. in buildings and
markers).
5 By contrast, the largest component of the recurrent costs of compliance is
additional costs for skilled labor. Other recurrent cost components, such as the certificate for
the standard or investment in safety cloth, only add a small part to the total cost of
compliance.
Figure  3 shows that the degree of variance regarding compliance costs is strong. The
minimum costs of compliance are about 35 €/ha per year, while the maximum cost of
compliance are nearly 1,500 €/ha per year. To explain the high level of variance, data were
analyzed with respect to farm size as a potential determinant for cost differences among
producers. A negative correlation of -0.589
6 is identified between the variables of farm size
and cost of compliance per ha and year. The survey results suggest that large-scale farms
benefit from economies of scale both in terms of non-recurrent costs (-0.558) as well as in
recurrent ones (-0.327). However, the degree of correlation only ranges between low and
medium, which indicates that non-recurrent costs are influenced more by other determinants
than by farm size (i.e. the technical level before compliance). 
Furthermore, the data show a low level of correlation between recurrent cost and farm size.
The largest component of the recurrent cost is additional labor costs. Even though some very
small farms face relatively high additional labor costs per ha, no significant negative
correlation is found between the size of the farm and labor costs per ha and year.
The analysis of the benefits of certified producers showed that producers perceive the benefits
of compliance to be very diverse. The largest part (41% of the interviewees) indicated having
                                                
5 Time periods for depreciation rely on own plausibility considerations. 
6 Correlation is calculated by Sperman’s ROH, since both variables were not normally distributed. 13
medium benefits
7 from the certification, 27.6% of the interviewees indicated having high to
very high benefits and 26% indicated having very low to low benefits of compliance. Only
two producers indicated receiving better prices since they were certified. However, both of
them underlined that a certification alone does not change prices. It was rather the new
marketing strategy which accompanied the certification which resulted in higher prices by
conquering new markets. 13 producers indicated that they see themselves as having better
marketing possibilities with the certificate. Another 10 interviewees indicated that they hope
to have better marketing conditions in future. Most interviewees, however, indicated that the
largest benefit of EUREPGAP is the fact that it minimizes the risk of potential market share
losses. 
5  Conclusions
The analysis of the decision process, coupled with the comparison of the decision process of
certified and non-certified producers, opens up various interesting results and possibilities for
interpretation. 
One of the most important results of the survey is that being small in size seems to be
overvalued in the discussion, especially when talking about the technical upgrading cost of
the farm. Even though very large farms tend to become certified to a larger extent than
smaller ones, the results do not suggest that small producers are particularly disadvantaged in
the compliance process, as farm size correlates only marginally with the cost of compliance. 
Instead, the results rather point to the fact that less-organized or less integrated farmers tend to
be less favored, especially as forward integration diminishes the cost of compliance. Forward
integration tends to be of particular importance because of the direct access to information on
the buyers’ requirements. The vertical information flow plays a major role in the motivation
to become certified. This is underlined by the finding that most non-integrated producers pay
                                                
7 High benefits range on a scale from 1 to 8 between 7 and 8, medium benefits between 3 and 5 and low benefits 1 and 2. 14
little attention to the importance of EUREPGAP in maintaining market share, in contrast to
their vertically integrated colleagues. 
Non-integrated producers mainly depend on horizontal information from other producers
regarding all market developments in the EU. However, the results indicate that there is little
interest in the sector in keeping non-integrated producers in the market by providing them
information on particular market developments. One reason for that might be the very
regulated EU import policy for Moroccan tomatoes. Morocco is only allowed to export a
preferential quota of around 200,000 tons of tomatoes per year to the EU, and even though it
has the production capacity, Moroccan suppliers are keen not to exceed this preferential
quota. Hence, exporters are extremely interested in aggregating much of the quota within a
small group of producers. According to various interviewees, the already very limited number
of non-integrated producers’ products for the export market will disappear within few years.
However, this trend could of course change if the EU were ready to abandon its entry price
system. 
However, using the term “small” as a synonym for less organized, less educated and
technically less advanced production, as is often the case when analyzing smallholders’
production, tends to be false when looking at small producers participating in the Moroccan
tomato export sector, where producers are often only small in relative terms, and frequently
much larger in size and in capital and human capital than small or even medium-sized
producers producing only for the domestic market. 
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